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PUBLIC UTILITIES- RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR PLUS
NONDELEGABLE DUTY TO PROTECT PATRONS
M UGH difference of opinion exists in the cases as to the nature
and extent of the duty of a public utility to its patrons. When,
for example, a passenger in a taxicab is injured by the outrageous
acts of the driver, is the taxicab company's liability governed by
the duty to use due care ["the utmost care compatible with
driving"'] together with the doctrine that a principal is liable for
the acts of an agent only when done within the scope of his employ-
ment? Or is there an additional extraordinary duty - a sui
generis nondelegable duty-which not only transcends the doe-
' The standard of care required in West Virginia in this class of cases is
the "utmost care compatible with the practicable operation of the vehicle."
See, e. g., Venable v. Gulf Taxi Line, 105 W. Va. 156, 141 S. E. 622 (1928);
Gilmore v. Huntington Cab Co., 21 S. E. (2d) 137 (W. Va. 1942). In order
to measure up to the standard of "due care", a common carrier must, as the
courts often put it, exercise a so-called "highest degree of care" or the utmost
care compatible with the operation of the particular mode of transportation.
Sometimes this measure of care is dealt with as something more than "due
care".
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trine of respondeat superior but materially limits the applicability
of the ordinary defenses of contributory negligence and assumption
of risk?
Several West Virginia decisions, including one handed down
on August 1, 1942,- aptly illustrate the pertinency of these ques-
tions. In one of the earliest cases in point, a case decided in' 1890,8
a brakeman on a train wantonly assaulted a passenger. The
principal was held liable. The basis of liability was not, however,
stated by the court.
What then is the nature of the duty which is breached in such
a case? Suppose that the assault has nothing whatever to do
with the work which the particular agent is employed to do. Thus
in a leading case a conductor kissed a female passenger without
her consent. Clearly the conductor's act was not within the scope
of his employment; he was "on a frolic of his own". Therefore the
ordinary doctrine of respondeat superior would not impose liability.
Yet the principal was held responsible.4  Similarly where a porter
on a Pullman car criminally attacked a girl.5 So, too, in an im-
portant West Virginia case in which a railroad company was held
liable to a passenger for an insult by a conductor though the insult-
ing act was unattended by physical injury or deprivation of the
transportation which the passenger sought.6 Likewise, to cite only
one more of numerous examples in point,7 where a telegraph agent
used indecent language to a patron, the utility was held liable even
though no one else heard the insult.8
The nature and extent of this stringent duty are illuminatingly
indicated in a comparatively early West Virginia case in which
the court used the following language:
"'It is among the implied provisions of the contract be-
tween a passenger and a railway company that the latter has
employed suitable servants to run its trains, and that passengers
shall receive proper treatment from them; and a violation of
L Gilmore v. Huntington Cab Co., 21 S. E. (2d) 137 (W. Va. 1942).
3 Ricketts v. Chesapeake & Ohio R. R., 33 W. Va. 433, 10 S. E. 801 (1890).
4 Craker v. Chicago & N. W. By., 36 Wis. 657 (1875).
5 Campbell v. Pullman P. C. Co., 42 Fed. 484 (N. . Iowa 1890).
6 John v. Baltimore & 0. R. R., 82 W. Va. 149, 95 S. E. 589 (1918).
7 See, e. g., Nichols v. Camden Interstate Ry., 62 W. Va. 409, 59 S. E. 968
(1907) ; Teel v. Coal & Coke Ry., 66 W. Va. 315, 66 S. B. 470 (1909) ; MceDade
v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 67 W. Va. 582, 68 S. E. 378 (1910); Turk v. Norfolk &
W. Ry., 75 W. Va. 623, 84 S. E. 569 (1915). But of., McKain v. Baltimore &
0. R. R., 65 W. Va. 233, 64 S. B. 8 (1909).
8 Buchanan v. Western Union Tel. Co., 115 S. C. 433, 106 S. E. 169 (1920).
Cf. Diua v. Western Union Tel. Co., 59 S. E. 189 (Ga. App. 1907).
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this implied duty or contract is actionable in favor of the pas-
senger injured by its breach, though the act of the servant was
willful and malicious, as for a malicious assault upon a pas-
senger committed by any of the train hands, whether within
the line of his employment or not. The duty of the carrier
towards a passenger is contractual, and among other implied
obligations is that of protecting a passenger from insults or
assaults by other passengers or by their own servants.' 2 Wood,
R'y Law, p. 1194. There is no inquiry in such case as to
whether the wrong to the passenger is within the scope of his
authority, or whether his act is wanton.' '
To be sure, we realize today that this extraordinary duty of a
public utility to its patrons is relational rather than contractual,
i. e., it arises out of the peculiar relation existing between public
-utility and patron and is not dependent on contract."0  But other-
wise this West Virginia statement of the duty is fairly representa-
tive of the better view.:"
This duty of a common carrier is therefore more than a duty
to use care; it is more than a duty to use the utmost care compatible
with the operation of the particular mode of transportation; it is
this and more: it is an affirmative duty to provide such protection
for the patron as is reasonably practicable.'" And this duty is non-
delegable, i. e., the one operating such a public service cannot escape
responsibility for the proper performance of this duty by delegating
the duty to an agent.13 Therefore if one who undertakes such a
public service turns the preformance of it over to another he is
responsible for the proper carrying out of this duty precisely as if
he had performed the service in person and had himself breached
the duty.
The extraordinary nature of this duty has been further in-
dicated by the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia in the
9 Bess v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 35 W. Va. 492, 494, 14 S. E. 234 (1891).
Italics ours.
10 See I WYMAN, PUBLIC SERVIcE CoRPoRATIoNs (1911) §§ 331, 333 et seg.
See also POUND, THE SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAw (1921) 29. ..... we have
established that the duties of public service companies are not contractual,
as the nineteenth-century sought to make them, but are instead relational;
they do not flow from agreements which the public servant may make as he
chooses, they flow from the calling in which he has engaged and his conse-
quent relation to the public."
1 See 2 WYMrAN, PUBLIC Ssav=IC CoRPoRATIoNs, c. 27; 1 RESTATEMENT,
AGENCY (1933) § 214, including Comment.
1S See 2 WYMAN, PUBLIC SEavcE CORPORATIONS, c. 27. See particularly
Bess v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 35 W. Va. 492, 14 S. E. 234 (1891) quoted supra
at note 9.
13 See 1 RESTATEMENT, AGENCY § 214, including Comment.
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case of Joh?. v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company, decided in
1918.11 Said the court:
"A breach of the obligation of a common carrier to its
passenger, working injury to him, is a cause of action standing
upon a higher plane than that of one arising from an injury
by mere negligence, because the relation subsisting between
them is founded upon a direct, special and personal obligation,
peculiar in its nature, and not upon general law constituting
the basis of the relation subsisting between many other per-
sons, such as neighbors or strangers, who stand upon an equal
footing and deal with each other at arm's length, wherefore
conduct on the part of a carrier working grievous injury only
to the feelings and sensibilities of a passenger is actionable. "1
Because, as the West Virginia court puts it, a public utility
and its patron do not "stand upon an equal footing and deal with
each other at arm's length" and "because the relation subsisting
between them is founded upon a direct, special and personal obli-
gation, peculiar in its nature, and not upon general law", it would
seem to follow that the "general-law" defenses of contributory
negligence and assumption of risk may well have a somewhat more
limited application in public utility law than in ordinary private
law. If,, for example, a passenger in a taxi observes that the lights
are defective, continuing the journey with such knowledge does
not per se amount to contributory negligence and therefore bar
recovery for personal injury due to driving with improper lights.'5
The affirmative nondelegable duty to provide such protection for
the patron as is reasonably practicable gives the passenger a right
to assume that the authorized operator of the vehicle will fully
perform this duty.'7 Said the court in this case:
"Complaint is made of the refusal of the [trial] court
to give an offered instruction on contributory negligence, it
14 82 W. Va. 149, 95 S. E. 589 (1918).
'5Point 2 of the syllabus. At page 151 the court adds: t.. the prin-
ciples under which recovery for mental anguish unattended by physical injury
is denied in the application of the law of negligence and between persons not
peculiarly related, such as mere neighbors or strangers, do not apply. A
carrier assumes and holds a legal, economic and social position which brings
the traveling public within its own power and influence, as regards their per-
sons and their comforts and conveniences, to a very considerable extent, where-
fore it and its passsenger do not stand on an equal footing nor deal with each
other at arm's length."
Is See Shelton Taxi Co. v. Bowling, 244 Ky. 817, 51 S. W. (2d) 468 (1932).
In this case, however, there was evidence that the passenger had protested
against going further without lights. But after an unsuccessful attempt to
obtain lights it seems that he elected to go on.
17 See Shelton Taxi Co. v. Bowling, 244 Ky. 817, 51 S. W. (2d) 468 (1932).
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being argued that there was evidence tending to show that
appellee elected to continue the journey with knowledge of the
fact that the lights were defective. Appellant being engaged
in the business of transporting passengers for hire, was a com-
mon carrier, Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Molloy's Adm'x, 122 Ky.
219, 91 S. W. 685, 28 Ky. Law Rep. 1113; Anderson v. Yellow
Cab Co., 179 Wis. 300, 191 N. W. 748, 31 A. L. R. 1197, and
therefore under the duty to use the highest degree of care for
the safety of its passengers, and 'the highest degree of care'
means the utmost care exercised by prudent and skillful per-
sons in the operation of the conveyance. Louisville & N. R. Co.
v. Kemp's Adm'r, 149 Ky. 344, 149 S. W. 835; Consolidated
Coach Corporation v. Hopkins, 228 Ky. 184, 14 S. W. (2d)
768. In view of this rule appellee had the right to assume
that appellant's driver, whatever may have been the situation,
would exercise the care necessary to transport him safely. The
driver was not subject to his control, or under his direction,
and appellee was under no duty to warn him, or to interfere
with his driving. In short, the case is one where appellee did
nothing that tended in the least to bring about the accident,
and appellant could not transfer to him, a mere passenger, its
responsibility for its own neglect."' 18
If a passenger's knowledge that the taxicab's lights are de-
fective will not per se bar recovery, will his knowledge that the
driver is "defective", e. g., intoxicated, constitute either contribu-
tory negligence or assumption of risk in case the passenger with
such knowledge enters upon or continues upon his journey with
such driver? This question was interestingly raised, though per-
haps not squarely adjudicated, in a recent West Virginia case."9
There it was admitted that the driver of a taxicab was intoxicated
at the time of the plaintiff's injury which resulted from the over-
turning of the taxi. Moreover, he became intoxicated in the
presence of the plaintiff. Whether the passenger knew, when she
entered the cab, that the driver was so drunk that he could not
safely operate the car was, however, not altogether clear. But the
passenger and the driver had had some intoxicating drinks to-
gether.20  Shortly before the car overturned, the plaintiff protested
is Id. at p. 821.
19 Gilmore v. Huntington Cab Co., 21 S. E. (2d) 137 (W. Va. 1942).
2b The plaintiff, together with Lafe Clark and Sadie Clark, got in a taxi
driven by Himes and started to "Tanner's hamburger stand." "En route
there, each of the passengers 'took a little drink of brandy', and, according to
the testimony of Sadie Clark and plaintiff, Himes stopped the cab and re-
quested a drink of the brandy, to which request Clark acquiesced.
"There is a conflict in the testimony offered by plaintiff as to what oc-
curred when they reached Tanner's. Plaintiff and Sadie Clark testified that
Lafe Clark paid Himes the fare and, advising him that 'we wouldn't be out
5
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to the driver that he was going too fast, and it would seem from the
facts in the case'" that the passenger probably should have kmown
that the drinking was such that it was calculated to affect the
driver's ability to operate the taxi safely.2 The court held, in a
three-to-two decision, that the taxicab company was liable.2"
If this decision is supportable- and the weight of authority
tends to support it 24 - the conclusion must be justified, it would
seem, on the ground that, because of the affirmative nondelegable
duty of a common carrier to protect its patrons so far as reasonably
there but a little bit', asked Himes for his name and number, that Himes then
'got in the cab', that the others went into Tanner's, occupied a booth, and
plaintiff and Sadie each ordered a Coca-Cola and Lafe Clark a beer, and ' about
the time they brought our order', Himes came in and asked if he might sit
with his passengers, and the response being favorable, he joined them. Himes
stated, however, that the women preceded Clark into Tanner's and while paying
the fare, Clark asked him if he wanted another drink and Himes having
answered in the negative, Clark invited him to drink a Coca-Cola. Himes
ordered beer. According to him he consumed three or four bottles, while plain-
tiff and Sadie Clark are positive in their testimony that he drank only one and
one-half bottles. The remainder of the brandy was poured into an empty
Coca Cola bottle and consumed by the four....
"Between nine and nine-thirty o'clock the three passengers and Himes
proceeded to Poe's Raven, located in Wayne County, twelve or fourteen miles
from Tanner's. Himes invited Sadie Clark to ride in the front seat with him,
while Lafe Clark and plaintiff occupied the rear seat. Plaintiff testified that
Himes 'started just like any other cab. And then he speeded.' She estimated
Himes' driving at sixty or seventy miles an hour. There was a protest from
each of the passengers and a request that Himes drive 'a little slower'. Having
complied with the request, Himes then announced that he was 'not going to
drive like this', began to speed, and in going around a curve, the car upset."t
51 See footnote 20 for a detailed statement of the facts.
22As Fox, J., dissenting, said: "The defendant cab company furnished the
plaintiff and her companions a sober driver. He became intoxicated thereafter,
and that intoxication resulted from drinking in the presence of the plaintiff,
and, if ndt on the invitation of some members of her party, certainly with her
knowledge and acquiescence. I think it clear that the driver was intoxicated
at the time of the accident, and whether plaintiff knew that he was actually in
an intoxicated condition at the time she entered the automobile with him, sub-
sequent to the drinking of which she had knowledge, is relatively immaterial.
She did know of this drinking, and should have known that it was calculated
to affect his ability to carefully drive an automobile. In these circumstances,
when she entered the automobile driven by him, she assumed the risk, and this
bars recovery on her part." Rose, J., concurred in this dissent.
23 More narrowly stated, and perhaps more accurately, the court held on this
point that the "trial court correctly regarded the issue of plaintiff's con-
tributory negligence one for jury determination." The court therefore re-
fused to disturb the verdict of the jury in favor of the passenger.
v4 See, e. g., Morris v. City Transfer & Yellow Taxi Co., 220 Ky. 219, 294
S. W. 1030 (1927); Shelton Taxi Co. v. Bowling, 244 Ky. 817, 51 S. W. (2d)
468 (1932); 4 Blashfield, Cyclopedia of Automobile Law & Practice (1935) §
2221. But see, e. g., Wayson v. Rainier Taxi Co., 136 Wash. 274, 239 Pac. 559
(1925); Arneson v. Buggs, 231 Wis. 499, 286 N. W. 19 (1939). Cf., also,
Peters v. Monongahela Transport Co., 109 W. Va. 417, 155 S. E. 178 (1930);
Koon v. Monongahela West Penn Public Service Co., 119 W. Va. 76, 192 S.
E. 332 (1937)'.
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practicable, a passenger is under no duty to anticipate a possible
breach of this obligation, but, on the contrary, has a right to assume,
at least so long as he acts in good faith, that the utility will furnish
the protection which it is legally bound to do. Unless the patron
may so assume, the result would seem to do violence to the un-
doubtedly sound theory that public utility and patron do not deal
with each other at arm's length. It is largely because of this in-
equality that the law imposes upon the utility a nondelegable duty
'o protect the passenger. But an affirmative duty to protect would
be an empty obligation unless the person entitled to the protection
were accorded a right to place a fair measure of reliance on due per-
formance.
TjoMAs P. HARDmAN.
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